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1 1 Introduction
In a controlled experiment, participants consider a security that has a seem-
ingly simple price transition. They are told that the security, if bought, has
to be held for exactly 12 months and is then to be sold.
You can buy the security at a price of 10,000 Euros. During each
month, the security’s price either increases by 70% or decreases by
60%. The two possible price changes in each month occur with equal
probabilities (”ﬁfty-ﬁfty”).
The instructions also explain that all random draws are independent.
They are written for maximal clarity, with the important exception that
they do not show the values of any compound price changes that accumulate
over time. The participants may thus misperceive the random price process,
given its compound nature.
The actual distribution of the security’s selling price is, as the reader can
verify, extremely skewed. A decrease by 60% cannot be undone by a single
increase by 70% and the typical price path therefore tends downward. If
the security was held inﬁnitely long rather than 12 months, the price would
converge to zero in probability. But already with a ﬁxed maturity after 12
months, the median selling price is as low as 989 Euros. Skewness shows in
the observation that the mean selling price after 12 months is much higher, at
17,959 Euros — the fact that 70% exceeds 60% implies that, in expectation,
increases dominate decreases.
Our laboratory experiment tests whether the participants correctly lo-
cate the median. Through a sequence of simple choice problems we identify
bounds on the median of each participant’s subjectively expected distribu-
tion and ﬁnd that it is typically far too high: 98% of the participants reveal
that they have a subjective median above 2,000 Euros, and 84% above 9,000
Euros. We conclude that the participants have an incomplete understanding
of the compound eﬀects of multiplicative shocks in our example. A further
2result is that the eﬀect is fairly robust to learning from feedback.1
We did not select this illustrative example for the sake of realism, of
course. Yet we note that many investments are subject to a multiplica-
tive compounding of shocks. In the option pricing literature, several leading
models are based on a multiplicative random process,2 as are many other
decision problems in economics and ﬁnance. Geometric growth of random
variables arises naturally in many models, like in our example. While an ar-
tiﬁcial experiment cannot generate quantitative statements that are portable
to the ‘real world’, it can generate novel and clean qualitative evidence —
to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study asking whether people understand
distributions arising from multiplicative random processes.
Our experiment is reminiscent of additive random processes that have
been studied experimentally, see e.g. Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) Be-
nartzi and Thaler (1999) and Klos, Weber and Weber (2005), all of whom
follow up on Samuleson’s (1963) hypothetical oﬀer of a sum of gambles to his
colleague. While a formal connection to our security appears to be immedi-
ate by taking the logarithm, a key discrepancy is that taking the logarithm
of our security leads to a sum of less-than-fair gambles, not more-than-fair
gambles like those studied in previous experiments. This feature of our secu-
rity is equivalent to the property that a 60% decrease weighs proportionally
stronger than a 70% increase, creating the extreme skewness that we exam-
ine.3
The next section gives the essential details on the experiment, while the
appendix contains the full instructions. Section 3 shows the results.
1In the ﬁfth repetition of our experiment, with feedback about the realized selling prices
(detailed in Section 2), 86% of subjective medians are still above 2,000 Euros and 55%
above 9,000 Euros.
2Our security matches exactly the underlying asset in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979).
3Other related literatures show that decision-makers misperceive exponential growth
(see Stango and Zinman, 2009, and the literature cited therein) and the return distributions
of diﬀerent ﬁnancial options (e.g. Gneezy, 1996, Abbink and Rockenbach, 2006). None of
these studies focus on skewness.
32 Experimental design
Choice problems: The experiment is designed to elicit the participants’
expectations, irrespective of their risk preferences. The monetary incentives
in each choice problem therefore involve only two possible payments — “re-
ceive a bonus” versus not — making it optimal for any decision-maker with
monotonic preferences to maximize the subjectively perceived probability of
receiving the bonus.
The choice problems are framed in a ﬁnancial investment context: two
risky securities are oﬀered and the selling price of the chosen security deter-
mines whether the bonus is paid.4 Security A is the security described in the
introduction. A participant who chooses this security receives the bonus if
the selling price at maturity exceeds a given threshold tA. The alternative
choice is Security B, which yields the bonus with probability one half. One
can immediately see that it is subjectively optimal for a participant to choose
Security A if and only if she believes that Security A yields the bonus with
probability more than one half. A choice for Security A thus reveals that the
median of her subjective probability distribution of Security A’s selling price
is below tA.
For a balanced description of the two choice options, Security B is phrased
analogously to Security A, with the diﬀerence that only a single price change
of +70% or -60% (equiprobably) occurs during the 12 months. A participant
who chooses Security B receives the bonus if the selling price of B exceeds
a separate threshold tB. This threshold is ﬁxed at the initial price of 10,000
Euros throughout the experiment whereas the threshold tA varies between
10 diﬀerent values (ranging from 100 to 250,000 Euros). Each experimental
participant makes a choice between A and B for each of the 10 possible
values of tA, allowing us to infer bounds on her subjective median of the
selling price of Security A. Table 1 shows the 10 choice problems as seen by
the participants.
Treatment conditions: Participants are randomly assigned to one of
4The descriptions begins with the wording: ”You are a manager and have to make a
decision between two risky investments”.
4Table 1: The 10 binary choices
Threshold for Threshold for Your decision
Security A Security B ( A or B)
Task 1 100 10,000
Task 2 500 10,000
Task 3 2,000 10,000
Task 4 6,000 10,000
Task 5 9,000 10,000
Task 6 12,000 10,000
Task 7 20,000 10,000
Task 8 35,000 10,000
Task 9 90,000 10,000
Task 10 250,000 10,000
two conditions that diﬀer in the extent to which the experimental instruc-
tions explain the implied distributions. The Control condition presents the
basic explanation. To introduce Security A, the instructions use the above
formulation “You can buy...”. This is followed by a statement about the in-
dependence of random draws and by the paraphrase that after month 1, the
security’s price is either at 17,000 Euros or at 4,000 Euros. The instructions
then repeat the random price transition, but without calculating compound
eﬀects explicitly: “At the end of month 2, the price is either 70% higher or
60% lower than at the end of month 1. At the end of month 3, the price
is either 70% higher or 60% lower than at the end of month 2. And so on,
...” The Security B is introduced with identical wording to that of Security
A (where applicable). Next, the thresholds tA and tB are explained and two
examples are given. Finally, participants face an understanding test of four
questions which they have to answer correctly before they may proceed. The
examples and understanding test are carefully chosen so to not suggest any
responses to the participants.
There remains the possibility that results in the Control condition are
driven by the choice format, the context frame or other cues. In particular,
the set of 10 threshold values can conceivably inﬂuence the responses.5 We
5We deliberately ﬁxed the 10 values of tA so that half of them exceed Security A’s
starting price of 10,000 Euros, in order to not suggest a direction of price change. However,
5address these concerns by including the Treatment condition where we
provide the participants with an additional explanation, leaving the remain-
der of the instructions unchanged. The additional text (about one written
page) gives an explicit calculation of the distribution of compound price
changes after two periods. It also points out the asymmetry in the selling
price distribution and lists the implicit probabilities of receiving the bonus
from choosing Security A for each value of tA. Any diﬀerence in responses
under the two conditions must stem from diﬀerences in the understanding of
these implied truths.
Feedback and repetitions: After the participants make their 10 choices,
each participant receives individual feedback in the form of a sample pair of
selling prices of Securities A and B. This concludes the ﬁrst round of the
experiment. The experiment is then repeated for four additional rounds of
the same nature, each including 10 choices and feedback. The feedback pro-
cedure and the choice format are identical for both treatment conditions.6
Procedures and payments: All 128 participants (68 in Control and
60 in Treatment) are students at Technical University Berlin. Six sessions,
three in each treatment condition, are conducted in a paper-and-pencil for-
mat. The protocol is ﬁxed across all sessions. The instructions are read
aloud to the participants, up to the beginning of the understanding test.
Participants receive a participation fee of 5 Euros and a possible bonus of
5 Euros per round. That is, participants can earn up to ﬁve bonuses of 5
Euros each, one per round of the experiment. After completing all choices,
each participant receives ﬁve random draws of integers between 1 and 10 to
determine which of the 10 choice problems in each round is payoﬀ relevant
for her. She receives the bonus for a given round if the selling price of the
chosen security in the payoﬀ-relevant problem exceeds its threshold.
this property may conceivably induce a midpoint eﬀect, leading the participants to switch
from A to B towards the middle of the list.
6Each additional round comes with the chance to earn a new bonus (see the next
paragraph in the main text), but this does not aﬀect the simple optimality conditions for
choice. Independent of other choices it remains optimal to choose A iﬀ the subjective
median is below tA.
63 Results
The data analysis is simpliﬁed by the observation that a participant with any
subjective belief about selling prices maximizes her preference by choosing
Security A for low values of tA and switching to B for all values higher
than her subjective median, i.e. she switches between the securities no more
than once. We observe such unique switching points in the large majority
of responses (93%) and restrict attention to these data.7 The benchmark
prediction is for all participants to choose A in the ﬁrst two tasks and then
switch to B. This is optimal as the true median of A’s selling price is between
the second and third threshold values.
Figure 1 shows the mean switching point for each round of the experi-
ment, separately for Control (solid line) and Treatment (dashed line).
More precisely, it shows the mean of task numbers at which participants
start choosing Security B.8 The dotted lines show the 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals, taken pointwise around the means at each round of the experiment.
As shown in the ﬁgure, the mean switching point in Control is 6.5 in the
ﬁrst round of the experiment and decreases to 5.1 in the ﬁfth round of the
experiment. In Treatment, the mean switching point is 3.8 in round one
and decreases to 3.3 in round ﬁve. Figure 2 shows histograms of the distri-
butions of switching points, again separately for each round of the experi-
ment and for the two conditions Control and Treatment. Both ﬁgures
show strong diﬀerences between the two conditions, and parametric t-tests
as well as non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests conﬁrm that all round-
by-round comparisons between the two conditions are statistically signiﬁcant
at p < 0.001. In particular, the treatment eﬀects are still highly signiﬁcant
in the last round of the experiment.
Table 3 reports the distributions of switching points that underlie Figure
2 and lists the implied ranges for the median of the participants’ subjective
7If a participant has multiple switching points in one round, her answers in the remain-
ing rounds are still considered. None of our conclusions would change if we dropped all
responses by subjects who switch strictly more than once in at least one round (12% of
participants), or if we included all data and considered each of the 10 tasks separately.
8We assign the value 11 if a participant always chooses A.
7Figure 1: Means of switching points, separated by round and Con-
trol/Treatment.
Figure 2: Distribution of switching points, separated by round and Con-
trol/Treatment.
8distributions of Security A’s selling price. The modal choice in round 1 in
Control is a switching point of 6 indicating a subjective median between
9,000 and 12,000 Euros. Not a single Control participant in round 1 reveals
a subjective median between 500 and 2,000 Euros (switching point of 3).
Instead, 98% of Control participants reveal that their subjective medians
are above 2,000 Euros in round 1, and still 86% in round 5. Under the
Treatment condition, 70% of responses are at the optimal switching point
of 3 already in round 1. Altogether, the data show a consistent pattern that
the performance is poor under the Control condition, and much better in
Treatment. Since the only diﬀerence between the two conditions lies in
the additional explanation, we conclude that Control participants have an
incomplete understanding of the implied distribution of Security A’s selling
price.
We run random eﬀects regressions to obtain a better description of re-
sponses over time, exploiting the panel structure of the data. This allows
accounting for individual heterogeneity as well as describing the reaction of
participants to their individually diﬀerent feedback information.9 The depen-
dent variable is a participant’s observed switching point in a given round,10
and the explanatory variables are Treatment (1 if in condition Treatment,
0 if in Control), Round and Feedback. The latter is a dummy variable
that is 1 if the participant’s sample feedback in the previous round has the
property that Security B’s selling price exceeds that of Security A. In this
case, participants get the ‘correct’ feedback that returns to investment in
Security A are likely to be small.
The estimation of model (1) in Table 2 repeats the main result that the
additional explanation in Treatment has a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Comparisons
with the richer models show that the coeﬃcient is fairly robust to changes in
the speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient of Round is negative and signiﬁcant (model
9The appropriateness of random eﬀect regressions is conﬁrmed by applying a Hausman-
test that does not reject the statistical independence between unobserved factors and the
explanatory variables used. A comparison to pooled OLS regressions shows no substantial
diﬀerences across comparable coeﬃcients.
10Translating the task number into the corresponding subjective median would not
change the main conclusions. But the subjective medians have some extreme outliers,
complicating the analysis.
9Table 2: Results from Random Eﬀects Regressions
Dep. Var: Switch (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment -2.129∗∗∗ -2.123∗∗∗ -2.791∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗∗ -2.095∗∗∗ -2.135∗∗∗ -2.755∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.33) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.33)
Round -0.237∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Treatment × Round 0.223∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Feedback -0.248∗ -0.355∗ -0.462∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
Treatment × Feedback -0.187 -0.299
(0.24) (0.23)
Constant 5.683∗∗∗ 6.393∗∗∗ 6.748∗∗∗ 5.879∗∗∗ 5.963∗∗∗ 6.840∗∗∗ 7.316∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.28)
N 596 596 596 596 596 596 596
(2)) indicating that participants adjust their decision over time. Moreover,
participants in Control make greater progress across rounds, as shown in
model (3). There, a test for sums of coeﬃcients shows that participants in
condition Treatment do not signiﬁcantly change their response over time.
Regarding the participant’s reaction to feedback, the coeﬃcient of the
Feedback dummy variable has the expected negative sign, i.e. participants
switch from A to B at a lower threshold if their feedback shows a relatively
low selling price for Security A. The eﬀect is less signiﬁcant, however, if
Round is not included (models (4) and (5)).11 Models (6) and (7) include
both Round and Feedback. The results remain essentially the same, except
that the coeﬃcient on Feedback is now signiﬁcant at lower levels. Overall,
the regression analysis conﬁrms that participants in Control have a poor
understanding of the median selling price of Security A, whereas in Treat-
ment their responses are signiﬁcantly closer to the optimal response.
11In an alternative speciﬁcation of the Feedback dummy we assign the value 1 if the
participant’s selling price of Security A lies above their subjective median in the previous
round. (To generate this variable, we lineraly interpolate each participant’s subjective
median to be the arithmetic average of the revealed bounds.) However, the corresponding
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12Appendix (not intended for publication): Instructions  
 
Welcome! 
You  are  about  to  participate in an experiment in decision making. Universities and  research 
agencies have provided the funds for this experiment.  
 
In this experiment we will first ask you to read instructions that explain the decision scenarios 
you will be faced with. We will also ask you to answer questions that test your understanding of 
what you read. Finally, you will be asked to make decisions that will allow you to earn money. 
Your monetary earnings will be determined by your decisions and by chance. All that you earn is 
yours to keep and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today's session. 
 
Only for coming here and completing the experiment, you will also receive a fixed participation 
fee of EUR 5.00. The earnings that you make during the experiment will be added to this 
amount. 
 
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have 
any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will 
come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and will forfeit your 




Procedure and payment structure 
         
You are asked to make a sequence of decisions. There are five rounds in this experiment. In 
each round, you have the opportunity to earn a bonus of EUR 5.00. In what follows, the term 
“bonus” will always refer to these EUR 5.00. All bonuses that you earn in any of the five 
rounds will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. 
 
Each round consists of a list of ten tasks. One of the ten tasks will be chosen by a random 
draw made on the computer. This task will be paid out for real. That is, if you were successful 
in the task that the computer picked,  you  will earn the bonus of EUR 5.00.  If  you were 
unsuccessful in the task that the computer picked, you will not receive a bonus in this round. 
 









You are a manager and have to make a decision between two risky investments, either to buy 
security A or to buy security B.  Either security, if bought, has to be held for 12 months. After 
the 12 months you sell the security. Depending on your investment success, you have the 
chance to earn a bonus. 
 Security A: 
 
You can buy the security at a price of 10,000 Euros. During each month, the 
security’s price either increases by 70% or decreases by 60%. The two possible 
price changes in each month occur with equal probabilities (“fifty-fifty”). The 
direction of price change (increase/decrease) is not influenced by the direction of 
price changes in previous months.  
Thus, at the end of month 1, the price is either 70% higher or 60% lower than at 
the beginning of month 1. That is, the price is either 17,000 Euros or 4,000 
Euros. At the end of month 2, the price is either 70% higher or 60% lower than 
at the end of month 1. At the end of month 3, the price is either 70% higher or 
60% lower than at the end of month 2. And so on, until you sell the security at its 
price at the end of month 12.  
 
Security B:  
 
You can buy the security at a price of 10,000 Euros. During month 1, the price of 
security B moves identically to the price of security A. After the end of month 1, 
the price stays constant until the end of month 12.  
Thus, at the end of month 1, the price is either 70% higher or 60% lower than at 
the beginning of month 1, with equal probability. That is, the price is either 
17,000 Euros or 4,000 Euros. The price then stays constant until you sell the 
security at the end of month 12. 
 
The following rule determines  your payment: If the selling price of the security that  you 






The thresholds differ between security A and security B. Security B’s threshold always equals 
its  initial  price  of  10,000  Euros.  Security  A’s  threshold  varies  between  100  and  250,000 
Euros.  
 
For each of the possible thresholds of security A and security B that are presented in the table 
below, you will be asked to make a decision between A and B. These are the 10 tasks for one 
round of this experiment.  
 
Threshold for  
security A: 
Threshold for  
security B: 
Your decision 
(A or B): 
Task 1  100  10,000  
Task 2  500  10,000  
Task 3  2,000  10,000  
Task 4  6,000  10,000  
Task 5  9,000  10,000  
Task 6  12,000  10,000  
Task 7  20,000  10,000  
Task 8  35,000  10,000  
Task 9  90,000  10,000  
Task 10  250,000  10,000  
 
Example 1 
Consider  Task  1,  where  the  threshold  for  security  A  is  100  Euros,  and  the  threshold  for 
security B is 10,000 Euros.  
Suppose that you decide to buy security A. If the selling price of security A is higher than 100 
Euros, you receive the bonus. If the selling price is less than or equal to 100 Euros, you do not 
receive the bonus.  
Now, suppose instead that you decide to buy security B. If the selling price of security B is 
higher than 10,000 Euros, you receive the bonus. If the selling price of security B is less than 
or equal to 10,000 Euros, you do not receive the bonus. 
 
Example 2 
Consider Task 2, where the threshold of security A is higher than in the previous example, at 
500 Euros, and the threshold for security B is again 10,000 Euros.  
First, suppose that you decide to buy security A. In this case, if security A’s selling price is 
higher than 500 Euros, you receive the bonus. Otherwise, you do not receive the bonus.  
If, instead, you decide to buy security B, you receive the bonus if the selling price of security 
B is higher than 10,000. Otherwise, you do not receive the bonus. 
 




[The following page is for participants in condition TREATMENT only.] 
 
How likely does security A’s selling price exceed its threshold? 
 
As security A’s selling price is determined by 12 price changes, there are 13 possible selling 
prices for security A altogether: the lowest price results if security A’s price decreases in each 
of the 12 months; the second-to-lowest price results if 11 price changes are decreases and 1 is 
an increase; and so on. 
 
An important property of security A is that if the price decreases once it requires multiple 
price increases to compensate for the decrease. A single price increase by 70% cannot make 
up for a single decrease by 60%.  For example, consider the price at the end of month 2. If the price change in month 1 is 
downward, i.e. a decrease from 10,000 Euros to 4,000 Euros, then an increase in month 2 
would only yield a price of 6,800 Euros, well below the starting price of 10,000 Euros. 
Likewise, if the first price change is an increase from 10,000 Euros to 17,000 Euros but the 
second price change is a decrease, then the price at the end of month 2 would again be only 
6,800 Euros (which is 40% of 17,000 Euros). For the price to exceed 10,000 Euros at the end 
of month 2, the price would therefore have to increase twice in a row – from 10,000 Euros to 
17,000 Euros in month 1, and from 17,000 Euros to 28,900 Euros in month 2.  
 
The example illustrates a general feature of security A: it has a small probability of ending up 
at an extremely high price, and a large probability of ending up at low prices.  
 
The following table shows how many price increases are required for security A’s selling 
price to exceed the threshold, in each of the 10 investment tasks. The table’s final column 
shows exactly how likely the selling price exceeds the threshold.  
 
 
Threshold for  
security A: 
Required # of 





Task 1  100  5 or more  80.6 % 
Task 2  500  6 or more  61.3 % 
Task 3  2,000  7 or more  38.7 % 
Task 4  6,000  8 or more  19.4 % 
Task 5  9,000  8 or more  19.4 % 
Task 6  12,000  8 or more  19.4 % 
Task 7  20,000  9 or more  7.3 % 
Task 8  35,000  9 or more  7.3 % 
Task 9  90,000  10 or more  1.9 % 
Task 10  250,000  11 or more  0.3 % 
 
For example, in Task 1, the selling price of security A exceeds the threshold if the price 
increases during 5 or more of the 12 months. This happens with probability 80.6%. The 
higher the threshold, the higher the number of required price increases. For example, in Task 
2, the selling price exceeds the threshold if the price increases in 6 or more months. This 
happens only with probability 61.3%. Similarly, you can read in the subsequent lines how 
likely the threshold is met in the other tasks. 
 
For comparison, recall that security B has a selling price of 17,000 Euros or 4,000 Euros, with 
equal probability, and a threshold of 10,000 Euros. Therefore, in each task, security B’s 
selling price exceeds its threshold with probability 50%.  
 





For each round, one of the 10 tasks is picked at random. Each task is picked with equal 
probability by a computerized random draw. Depending on your decision in the task that is 
picked by the computer, you will receive the bonus or not. 
 
After each round, you will learn the selling prices of both securities. We obtain these prices 
by means of computer simulation, which is conducted individually for each participant. You 
will receive the price information on a separate sheet of paper after each round. The selling 
price of your chosen security determines whether you receive the bonus in this round. 
 
We then continue with another round of 10 tasks. (Recall there are 5 rounds.)  
 
Are there questions about the tasks or payment rules in this experiment? If so, please raise 
your hand and we will help you at your desk. 
 
If there are no further questions at this point, you will now face a brief understanding test. 
Only if you answer all questions correctly, you will proceed to the actual tasks. 
 
In the top right corner of the understanding test, please enter the code number that you were 
assigned when you entered the laboratory. Please also enter this number on all subsequent 





Code number: _________ 
 
Please record your code number on this sheet, as well as on all subsequent sheets during 
the experiment 
 
Consider  questions  (1)  to  (4)  below.  You  will  only  be  allowed  to  continue  with  the 
experiment after answering all questions correctly. If you have a question of any kind, please 
raise your hand. 
Questions: 
(1) Suppose you buy security B in the task that is picked by the computer. Suppose the 
selling price of security B is 17,000 Euros. Do you receive a bonus? ______ 
(2) Suppose you buy security A in Task 1. Suppose the selling price of security A is 
higher than 100 Euros. Do you receive a bonus if Task 1 is picked by the computer? 
______ (3) Suppose you buy security A in Task 10. Suppose the selling price of security A is less 
than 250,000 Euros. Do you receive a bonus if Task 10 is picked by the computer? 
______ 
(4) Suppose you buy security A in both Task 1 and Task 10. Which of the two tasks has 
the higher chance that the selling price exceeds the threshold? _________ 
Once you finish the understanding test, please wait for instructions for the decisions. If 
you have a question, please raise your hand. Please make sure that the code number is 






Code number: _________ 
 
 Round 1  
 
 
Threshold for  
security A: 
Threshold for  
security B: 
Your decision 
(A or B): 
Task 1  100  10,000  
Task 2  500  10,000  
Task 3  2,000  10,000  
Task 4  6,000  10,000  
Task 5  9,000  10,000  
Task 6  12,000  10,000  
Task 7  20,000  10,000  
Task 8  35,000  10,000  
Task 9  90,000  10,000  
Task 10  250,000  10,000  
 
 
Once you finish making the decisions, please wait until the experimenter collects the 
decision sheets. If you have a question, please raise your hand. Please make sure that the 
code number is recorded on the first decision sheet. 
[page break] 
 [feedback form] 
 
Code number: _________ 
 
Selling prices in round 1: 
 
Security A: ____________ 
 
Security B: ____________ 
 






Please provide the information requested below, but do not write your name. (Please respond 
truthfully to aid us in our research. You can be assured that all information will be stored in a 
100% anonymous way, ensuring your privacy.)  
CODE NUMBER_________                          Date 
_________. 
Age:___   Sex:______   Nationality: _______________ 
Undergraduate___ Graduate___ Year of study _____. 
Main Subject of Study _______________ 
Your average monthly budget, including all expenses for food and lodging: 
_____________ 
Do you currently work for money? ____________ 
Please indicate your main source of income: ________________________ 
In  your  household,  do  you  live  (check  all  that  apply):  ____with  parents  _____alone  
_____with partner  _____with children   ______none of the aforementioned, but sharing an 
apartment with someone else. 
Did you take a mathematics course as an undergraduate? ____yes     ____no 
Indicate the duration of schooling that your mother received, including any higher 
education, by checking the number of years that comes closest: ____4    ___8   ____12   
____16    _____20 
Indicate your father’s years of schooling: ____4    ____8   ____12   ____16    _____20 
 
THE  FOLLOWING  ARE  SOME  NUMERICAL  PROBLEMS.  PLEASE  ANSWER 
THEM AS BEST YOU CAN. 
 
First problem: What is 15% of 1,000? ______ 
 Second problem: A car rental agency charges $35 a day plus $0.14 per mile for its rental 
cars.  If these charges include tax, what is the total cost of travelling 300 miles over 3 
days in a car rented from this agency?  
_____$42   _____$105     ______$125   _____$147      _____$300 
 
Third problem: Which of the following is larger than 3/5?    
_____19/35    ______13/20    ______4/7    ______7/13    _____None of the above 
 
Fourth  problem:  If  it  takes  5  people  5  months  to  save  a  total  of  $5,000,  how  many 
months would it take 100 people to save a total of $100,000? _______ 
 
Fifth problem: A TV and a radio cost $110 in total. The TV costs $100 more than the 
radio. How much does the radio cost? _________ 
 
Sixth problem: In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Each day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for 
the patch to cover half of the lake? __________ 